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rn THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PETE~ DOENGES, MILES CROCKARD 
WILLIAM BOWEN, RICHARD H. WATSON 
CARL PETERSON, and EMIGRATION ' 
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff-Respondents, 
v, 
CITY OF SALT LAKE CITY, a 
municipal corporation; 
EMIGRATION PROPERTIES PARTNERSHIP 
a Utah limited partnership, BOWERS-
SOREnSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, and FRED A. SMOLKA, 
Defendant-Appellants, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16649 
This appeal is from a Memorandum Decision of 
Judge Dean E. Conder, of the Third Judicial District Court, 
holding that the annexation procedures of Section 10-2-401, 
Utah Code Ann. (Pocket Supp. 1977) limiting the petitioning 
portion of the annexation procedure to persons owning property 
within the area to be annexed violated the equal protection 
requirement of both the United States and Utah State Consti-
tutions. 
II. PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
On April 10, 1979, the Salt Lake City Commission 
voted unanimously to annex portions of Emigration Canyon to 
Salt Lake City. On April 17, 1979, a Temporary Restraining 
Orde1 was issued, restraining the City from taking any steps 
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in furtherance of the Commission's decision of annexation. 
(Record on Appeal at R. 181 (hereinafter pages in Record will 
be referred to as "R. __ ".).) On May 29, 1979, plaintiffs' 
motion for a preliminary injunction and the defendants' 
motions to dismiss the complaint and to dissolve the Temporary 
Restraining Order were heard before the Honorable Bryant H. 
Croft. Judge Croft found that the complaint did not state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted and that there was 
no injury claimed or shown to support injunctive relief. 
(Partial Transcript of Proceedings, May 29, 1979, p. 8, at 
R. 1041.) Without dismissing the Complaint, Judge Croft allowed 
plaintiffs ten days in which to amend to state a claim including 
a claim for injunctive relief. (Id., pp. 14-15, at R. 1053-53.) 
Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint on June 7, 
1979. Request for injunctive relief pursuant to Rule 65(a) 
was omitted and no direct injury ·to the plaintiffs was 
alleged. (R. 359.) 
The Temporary Restraining Order was continued until 
August 20, 1979, even though a bond uas never filed and 
even though the Complaint in this action did not seek preliminary 
injunctive relief. 
On August 9, 1979, the defendants' motions for sumrna~ 
judgment and the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment 
were heard before the Honorable Dean E. Conder. Aside from the 
depositions and affidavits on file, no evidence was offered 
by the plaintiffs in further support of the Second Amended 
Complaint. 
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As a matter of law, the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District fuund and held by Memorandum Decision 
dated August 20, 1979, that the provisions of Section 10-2-401, 
Annexation of Contiguous Territory, Utah Code Ann. (Pocket Supp. 
1977), limiting to landowners the petition process triggering 
a hearing on the question of annexation violated both the United 
States and the Utah State's Constitutions' "equal protection" 
requirements. (R. 603-605.) (A copy of the statute Sections 
10-2-401 and 10-2-402 are attached hereto as Exhibit "A".) In 
its Memorandur:i Decision, the district court also granted a 
permanent injunction. (R. 605.) The district court found all 
other issues moot, and refrained from making a decision on any 
* issues. (R. 605.) The Hemorandum Decision did not, nor did 
the court, request separate Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law. 
On August 27, 1979, Defendant-Appellants filed a 
Notice of Appeal from the district court's Memorandum Decision. 
(R. 748.) Ten days later, upon the unsolicited submission 
by plaintiffs, the court signed a document entitled Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. 
On September 18, 1979, the defendants filed a Notice 
of Appeal from the entry of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment raising the issue, inter alia, that the 
district court was without jurisdiction to enter Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law as the court was without jurisdiction 
*Judge Conder explained in a conference on ~ctob7r 15, 1979, 
that he had not considered or decided defendants motions for 
summary judgment except tu the extent of the issue of 
constitutionality and had made no decision or determination of 
any other issues raised. 
-3-
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with the filing of the Notice of Appeal. The defendants filed 
a motion to set aside the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law or in the alternative, to amend them. The court concluded 
that as a Notice of Appeal had been filed, it had been divested 
of jurisdiction and could not consider the matter. 
III. RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant-Appellants respectfully request that 
this Court: (1) Strike the Findings of Fact and Conclusions~ 
Law and Judgment entered by the district court on September 6, 
1979, as that court was without jurisdiction to proceed in the 
matter after the filing of the Hot ice of Appeal on August 27, 191! 
Or, in the alternative, to strike the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on the ground that they are not supported 
by the evidence or the law; 
(2) Reverse the Memorandum Decision of August 20, 1971 
and find that the annexation provisions of Section 10-2-401, 
Utah Code Ann. (Pocket Supp. 1977) are constitutional within thi 
equal protection provisions of both the Federal and State 
Constitutions; 
(3) Find that the district court erred in failing 
to grant the Defendant-Appellants' motions for summary judgment; 
(4) Enter judgment for the Defendant-Appellants 
and dissolve the permanent injunction; 
(5) Find that the Salt Lake City Commission had the 
authority and had properly voted for annexation of Emieration 
Canyon; and 
(6) Order that annexation be forthwith completed. 
-4-
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IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Residents of Emigration Canyon Properly 
Petitioned the Salt Lake City Commission to Consider Annexation 
to Salt Lake City of Certain Areas Within Emigration Canyon. 
Between September 15, 1977, and August 8, 1978, three 
petitions for annexations of different contiguous areas within 
Emigration Canyon were filed with the Salt Lake City Commission. 
These petitions requested that the Salt Lake City Commission 
consider annexation of these areas to Salt Lake City. 
Petitions containing the signatures of more than 
one-half of the landowners owning more than one-third of the 
land within the area requesting annexation and a plat of the 
entire area to be annexed under the petitions were filed 
with the City as required by statute. These filings complied 
in all respects with the requirements of the annexation 
statutes, Sections 10-2-401 and 10-2-402. (Johnson Depo., 
p •. 4, at R. 898.) 
B. Upon the Filing of the Petition, Salt Lake City 
Began Considering the Advisability of Annexation and Held 
Numerous Public Hearings at which all Interested Parties were 
Allowed to Speak. Salt Lake City immediately began investigating 
the possibility of the proposed annexation. The three petitions 
were consolidated and considered as one by the Board of City 
Commissioners. (Mayor Wilson Depo., Exhibit 1, at R. .) 
The proposed annexation was investigated and studied 
by the Salt Lake City Planning and Zoning Commission from 
November of 1977, until the final hearing a;1d recommendation of 
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August 10, 1978. (Jorgensen Depo. pp. 18, 41, at R. 824.) 
During this period the Commission held numerous public hearings, 
(Jorgensen Depo., p. 41 & Ex. 9, at R. 824.) At these hearinos 
0 I 
petitions were received from any interested party including 
the Plaintiff-Respondents. Beginning November 10, 1978, 
Plaintiff-Respondents, through their attorney, Craig Smay, fil~ 
petitions with the Planning and Zoning Commission in opposition 
to the proposed annexation. (Jorgensen Depo., Exhibit No. 9, 
p. 1, at R. 824.) Again, on behalf of himself as a resident 
living within Emigration Canyon, and also on behalf of Plaintiff. 
Respondents, Mr. Smay appeared and presented arguments in 
opposition to the proposed annexation at the informal hearing 
before the Planning and Zoning Commission on March 10, 1979, 
(R. 824, Id. at, Ex. No. 9, p.8.) also present at that 
hearing and participating therein was the Plaintiff-Respondent 
Miles Crockard. (R. 824, Id. at,· Ex. 9, p. 9.) In addition, 
Plaintiffs' representative and attorney, Craig Smay, was 
avialable to the Planning and Zoning Commission to answer 
questions on the Plaintiff-Respondents' behalf in opposition 
to annexation. (R. 824, Id., at Ex. 9, pp. 32-33.) 
During the hearings and investigation, the Planning 
and Zoning Commission concluded that "The only way the area 
can be properly served is in the City." (R. 824, Id. at 
47.) The only access to this area was through the City. 
(R. 824, Id. at 58.) And, as part of the County, the area 
could not be developed. (R. 824, Id. at 15.) The Commission 
also found that the proposed annexation met the statutory 
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requirement of contiguity. "The east boundary [of the City] 
is the west boundary of the area to be annexed." (R. 824 Id. 
at 9.) 
The Plannine and Zoning Commission found that new 
zoning was an essential part of the annexation as Salt Lake City 
did not ·~ave a classification that would meet the needs of 
Emigration Canyon." (R. 824 Id. at 19.) Therefore, an extensive 
investigation was conducted considering water and sewer service, 
flood control, school, fire, garbage and police as well as 
the soil conditions, the amount of slope of the ground, and 
the traffic capabilities of the Canyon to determine just what 
zoning would be appropriate. (R. 824 Id. at 19-21; 43-44, 46, 47.) 
Two zoning regulations were proposed for Emigration Canyon. 
"R-lC" and "B-3C", both with an "F-1" overlay. (R. 824 Id. at 4-7.) 
These zoning classifications were "geared to the terrain, the 
special problems that you find in· canyon or canyon-like areas." 
(R. 824 Id. at 5.) 
After more than nine months of hearings wherein the 
arguments and petitions of all interested parties, both for 
and against annexation were considered, and the reports of all 
city cormnissions and departments were considered, the Planning 
and Zoning Collllllission, by letter dated August 24, 1978, recommended 
that the Salt Lake City Commission approve annexation of the 
areas within Emigration Canyon under certain specific conditions. 
(R. 824 Id. at 43-44, 18, 41 and Exhibit No. 1.) 
It is the feeling of the Planning Commi:sion that 
areas adjoining the City Limits, affecting the 
City, and where development can take place,. 
should be annexed to the City wherever possible, 
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--
thus filling the basic reason for a city, that of 
providing proper service to developable areas. 
In the case of Emigration Canyon, adequate services 
can be provided only by Salt Lake City. 
It is, therefore, the recommendation of the 
Planning Comrnission that a public hearing be 
held to consider annexing the property as 
requested •••• (R. 824, Id. at Ex. 1.) 
After receiving the recommendation from the Planning 
and Zoning Commission and the reports from all the department 
heads, the City Commission began its own investigation and 
hearings on the matter. As explained by Mayor Wilson at his 
deposition, the decision of the City Commission not only to 
join the petitions for annexation, but also to grant annexation 
of the area contained within the petition was based on extensive 
investigation by the City Commission. (Mayor Wilson Depo • 
PP• 27-33, at R. . ) 
Public hearings were held in late January and early 
February, 1979. Three days were ·set aside for hearint;s on 
this matter. During these public hearings no witness was cut 
off. Mr. Smay, a representative of the Plaintiff-Respondents, 
testified and was given an opportunity to discuss any and all 
matters he desired. (Wilson Depo. p. 30, at R. .) 
A. We allowed at least a full day 
for our department heads to come in and give us their 
both written and oral recommendations. 
Q. Then you also had the public hearings 
where citizens could come and voice their opinions? 
A. Yes. We had three days of hearings. The 
first day basically was the department head input. . 
The second day was basically--both sides would organiz, 
presentations. And then the third day was from any 
member of the public that hadn't had a chance ~o 
testify could come to the mike and express their 
feelings. (Mayor Wilson Depo. p. 29, at R. .) 
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C. Plaintiff-Respondents Participated Extensively in the 
Hearings on Annexation. Throughout the annexation proceedin<'s 
0 • 
the Plaintiff-Respondents had every opportunity to be heard. 
Following the filing of the petitions for annexation, numerous 
and extensive public hearings were held where the plaintiffs 
not only were given an opportunity to, but did appear and 
argue in opposition to annexation, 
First, the Salt Lake City Planning and Zoning 
Commission investigated the proposed annexation and held numerous 
public hearings beginning in November of 1977, and concluding 
August 10, 1979. (Exhibit #9 to the Jorgensen Deposition is 
the Minutes to all the meetings held to consider the annexation 
of Emigration Canyon. See, R. 824.) At these hearinl;S petitions 
were received from any interested party. A petition was filed 
on behalf of the Plaintiff-Respondents by Craig Smay on 
Hovember 10, 1977, opposing annexation and explaining the reasons 
therefore. (Jorgensen Depo., Exhibit 119, p. 1, at R. 824.) 
Again on behalf of himself and the Plaintiff-Respondents, Mr. 
Smay appeared at the March 10, 1978 informal hearing before 
the Planning and Zoning Commission and argued Plaintiff-Respondents' 
reasons for opposing annexation. (Jorgensen Depo., Exhibit 
#9, p. 8, at R. 824.) Also, taking part in that hearing was 
the Plaintiff-Respondent Miles Crockard. (Id., P• 9, at R. 824.) 
In addition, the Planning Commission had Craig Smay available 
to answer questions on behalf of those opposing annexation. 
(Id., Ex. 9 pp. 32-33, at R. 824.) 
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Three days of public hearings were held by the City 
Commission during which all interested parties were again allowe: 
to speak, including Mr. Smay speaking for the Plaintiff-
Respondents. (Bowen Depo., p.24, at R. .) 
Mr. Crockard attended and participated in Planning. 
and Zoning Commission hearings on the matter. (Jorgensen 
Depo., Exhibit 119, p. 9, at R. 824.) Mr. Peterson, the renterwi 
had been asked by Plaintiff-Respondents to lend his name to 
the law suit did not bother to attend any of the hearings. 
(Petersen Depo., pp. 14-15, at R. 826.) Mr. Bowen, attended 
the public meetings concerning annexation at Bonneville 
School, the City Commission and the Planning and Zoning 
Connnission. (Bowen Depo., pp. 5, 6, at R. .) Mr. 
Bowen also voiced his position to the Mayor in his office 
privately (Id., pp. 6, 18, 21, at R. , .) and to the City 
Commission at the public hearings: (Id., pp. 6, 21-22, 24, 
at R. • ) Mr. Bowen even presented an alternative 
annexation proposal to the City Commission which was considered 
but rejected as contrary to the annexation laws. (Id., PP• 
24-26, at R. .) Although not overly active, Mr. 
Watson also attended and participted in the public hearings 
concerning annexation. (Watson Depo., p. 16, at R. 827.) 
The Plaintiff-Respondent Doenges was actively involvea 
in the annexation process as he provided information to the 
City Commission and Planning Connnission and attended the hearing: 
And along the way I have also provided some 
information to the City Commission and tried to 
contribute to the digestion of the facts and . 
hearsay that our informal group has been advancing 
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to the City Cornrnission and concerned neighbors. (Doenges Depo., p. 8, at R. • ) 
Mr. Doenges testified that he had subnitted documents and had 
prepared typed testimony that were given to the City Commission 
for consideration. Plaintiff-Respondent Bowen also submitted 
prepared, typed testimony to the City Corrn:lission. (Doenges 
Depo., p. 9, atR. 
.) Mr. Doenges testified that he, with 
Plaintiff-Respondent Bowen, submitted "fairly voluminous documents" 
to the City Commission which are part of the Public record stating 
"engineering estimates and cost figures that we thought might 
pertain based on our inspection of the survey uaps that would 
bear on development feasibility relative to the proposed zoning 
ordinance." Doenges also testified that he made recommendations 
to the City Commission for the appointment of a "blue ribbon 
commission" to study total annexation of the Canyon. (Doenges 
Depo., p. 9, at R. .) It is interesting to note at this 
point that the City Commission adopted Mr. Doenges and the other 
Plaintiff-Respondents' recommendation that a "Blue Ribbon 
commission" be appointed. In the Mayor's motion to adopt the 
recommendation of the Planning and Zoning Commission, as modified, 
the Mayor moved that a "Blue Ribbon Corrn:lission" be established 
to advise the Salt Lake City Planning Commission, as suggested 
by Doenges, Bowen and others. (Mayor \Ji ls on Depo., Exhibit #1, 
at R. .) A "Blue Ribbon Co=ittee" was approved by the City 
Commission. (Letter from City Recorder to the City Commissioners, 
April 10, 1979, Wilson Depo., Exhibit #4, at R. .) 
In addition to the oral testinony which was given at 
the hearings, these three days, numerous letters, reports 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and documents were also received which formed the basis for 
the decision to vote in favor of annexation. As Mayor 
Wilson explained, there was, 
A stack that was about three or four inches 
thick and included recommendations from 
various city departments and also included 
recommendations from both developers and 
Canyon residents. 
It was also summarized by our department of 
development services. (Wilson Depo. p. 31, 
at R. .) 
During the period between the public hearings in 
January of 1979, and the final vote in April of 1979, there 
"1 
was considerable agitation in Emigration Canyon in an effort 
to remove names from the petitions and re-add the171. Representa· 
tive of the Plaintiff-Respondents, Mr. Craig Smay, on at least 
two occasions, sent letters to the residents of the Canyon 
in an effort to pursuade them to remove their names from the 
petitions favorinb annexation. (Gardner Det>O·, pp. 15-16, 24, 
at R. 843-44, 52.) In the first instance, Mr. Smay informed the 
residents of the Canyon that in certain circumstances if the 
proposed zoning was adopted, the residents would not be 
able to build on their existing lots. (Gardner Depo. PP• 
31, 15-16, 20-21, at R. 859, 843-44, 848-49.) Mr. Smay also 
suggested, in a letter to the residents of Emigration Canyon, 
that if annexation were accomplished, the tax burden of the 
residents in the annexed area would be greatly increased. 
(Gardner Depo. pp. 24, 37, at R. 852, 865.) 
Mr. Smay was busy attempting to get people to 
withdraw their names from the petitions, Mr. Gardner, an 
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:a· 
he 
employee of the Defendant-Appellant Emigration Properties 
Partnership, was discussing with the residents of the Canyon 
the value of annexation, (Gardner Depo., pp. 43-45, at R. 871-
873,) and attempting to get residents to re-sign petitions 
for annexation. (Gardner Depo., p. 14, at R. 842.) 
On April 10, 1979, Walter Miller of the City 
Attorney's office, and representatives of Defendant-Appellants 
met to review the petitions to determine the number of 
signatures on the final petitions. (Gardner Depo. pp. 48-
49, 50, at R. 876-78.) Although expressly invited (Gardner 
Depo. p. 53, at R. 881), Mr. Smay did not attend this meeting. 
(Gardner Depo. p. 55, at 882.) However, Mr. Miller of the City 
Commission office did review a list of concerns submitted by 
Mr. Smay to assure that the petitions met the statutory require-
ment. (Gardner Depo. pp. 49-50, at R. 877-78.) The City 
Attorney's office determined that the petitions did meet the 
statutory requirements: 
I have reviewed the petitions for annexation 
with Craig Smay, attorney for the plaintiffs in 
the above action, and Dave Johnson, President of 
Great Basin Title Company, retained by the 
developers, and each has described the insuff~c~encies 
or sufficiencies of the Emigration Canyon petitions 
they respectively perceive. Based upon that review, 
I am of the opinion that a majority of property 
owners on each of the annexation petitions presently 
favors connection to the City on the following 
particulars: 
Petition Ill 
Petition 112 
Petition 113 
55.76% 
100.00% 
100.00% 
The total property owners petitioning 
represent, by my figures, 61.25% of all property 
owners in the subject area. (Letter from Wally 
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Miller, Deputy City Attorney to Board of City 
Commissioners, April 10, 1979.) (Affidavit of 
Mildred Higham, at R. 171-172.) 
Prior to the actual vote, interested parties were a~ 
given opportunity to present their views to the City Coramission. 
Craig Smay spoke, and without making any specific objections, 
claimed that the petition was not valid. (Gardner Depo. p. 
50, at R. 879; Craig Peterson Depo. p. 6, at R. 823; Wilson 
Depo p. 30, at R. • ) 
A city's purpose for being is to: 
Provide for the safety, preserve the health, 
promote the prosperity and improve the morals 
peace, order, comfort and convenience of the 
inhabitants. (U.C.A. § 10-8-2.) 
After extensive hearings and investigations, the City Commissio 
concluded that annexation would accomplish these purposes and 
protect the entire Canyon community. Therefore, after all 
interested parties had been heard, the Mayor moved that 
Report No. 90 of the Public Planning and Development Commission 
be filed and with certain recommendations annexation of the 
portion of Emigration Canyon encompassed within the petitions 
be approved. (Mayor Wilson Depo., Ex. l, at R. , ) The Mayor 
motion carried unanimously. (Ibid.) The City Attorney was 
directed to prepare the necessary ordinances and contracts 
consistent with the proposed zoning ordinance necessary to 
implement annexation. (Mayor Wilson De po., Ex. 4, at R. .) 
The Mayor's motion carried unanimously. (Ibid.) The City 
Attorney was directed to prepare the necessary ordinances a~ 
contracts consistent with the proposed zoning ordinance 
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necessary to implement annexation. (Mayor Wilson Depa., Exhibit 
4, at R. .) 
D. The Plaintiff-Respondents have Neither Claimed nor 
Shown an Injury Resulting fror~ the Provisions of Section 10-2-401. 
No claims have ever been made, either in the complaint or by 
way of any evidentiary submissions that any of the plaintiffs 
in this case have suffered a protectable injury as a direct result 
of the petition provisions of Section 10-2-401. 
In their Complaint filed on April 1, 1979, and 
their Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief filed April 26, 1979, plaintiffs alleged as a practical 
matter, two causes of action--that the Salt Lake City Commission 
had not considered the evidence submitted and if this evidence 
were properly considered, annexation would not be decreed, and 
that the petition provision of the statute was unconstitutional. 
The Plaintiff-Respondents include four residents of 
Enigration Canyon and the Emigration Improvement District. 
The latter certainly will not be injured by annexation. In 
fact, the Emigration Improvement District does not oppose 
annexation and by letter dated July 26, 1979, requested that 
it be withdrawn as a party plaintiff because "annexation of 
the canyon by Salt Lake City would facilitate the purposes of 
the Improvement District." (R. 538.) Plaintiff-Respondent Carl 
Peterson is a university student and renter living within the 
area to be annexed. He did not become involved in opposing 
annexation until after the City Commission voted to annex 
the area on April 10, 1979. At that time, his landlord, who 
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opposed annexation and who had ci1e right to sign or refuse 
to sign the petition, asked Mr. Peterson if he would be 
willing to be a plaintiff in this action. 
He [the landlord] asked or had told me that 
someone had called and asked if they knew of anyone 
renting in the area, and they of course knew 
that I was there, and they had said that he would 
ask me if I would be willing to participate in 
this [action]. (Carl Peterson Depo. p. 5, lines 
21-24, at R. 826.) 
Mr. Peterson was told that if he was willing to help he should 
call Mr. Smay. (R. 826 at 6.) Although now named as a 
plaintiff, Mr. Peterson had no other involvement. He is not 
paying counsel to represent him. (R. 826, Id. at 9.) At his 
deposition he only claimed that he opposed annexation because 
that if people wanted the city services they should mov~ 
downtown. (R. 826 Id. at 7.) 
Mr. Crockard lives in the area to be annexed, 
participated in all of the hearings, and under the statute 
had a right to sign or refuse to sign the petition for annexal 
Mr. Crockard refused. He certainly was not and could not be 
adversely affected by the provisions of § 10-2-401 as he is 
included within those individuals who may petition the 
Commission to investigate the possibility of annexation. 
Mr. Crockard's only complaint and only claim to injury was 
that annexation would cause a change in his lifestyle. 
(Crockard Depo. pp. 16, 18, at R. 972, 974.) 
Plaintiff-Respondent William Bowen lives within Emi 
Canyon, but not within the area to be annexed. From the 
inception of the annexation movement, he has been very 
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active in opposing annexation. He claimed no injury to himself. 
He feared that small property owners living within the 
annexed area would not be able to build. (Bowen Depo., pp • 
9-10, at R. • ) He also hoped that other areas would 
be included within annexation. (Id., pp. 6-7, at R. 
. ) 
At all times, Mr. Bowen was represented at the hearings and 
participated personally. In fact, Mr. Bowen met with the Mayor 
to present an alternative plan for annexation. (Bowen Depo. 
pp. 18, 27-28, at R. ; Doenge3 Depo. p. 9, at R. .) 
Finally, the Plaintiff-Respondent Richard Watson is a 
resident within the area to be annexed who had purchased property 
within Emigration Canyon after November, 1978, (Watson Depo. 
p. 4, at R. 827.) His name did not appear on "the last 
assessment rolls" as those rolls had been prepared prior to 
his purchase of the property. Mr. Watson opposes annexation 
because the property he owns contains an easement for a road, 
which he was aware of when he purchased the property. (Id., 
p. 10, at R. 827.) If development in the annexed areas takes 
place, he fears that road will be built. (Id., P• 10, at R. 
827.) In addition, Mr. Watson opposes annexation because it 
would mean increased taxes, split neighborhoods, and the 
requirement to connect to the City sewer and water systems. 
(Id., p. 10, at R. 827.) Mr. Watson is represented by Craig 
Smay, who participated at the public hearings convened to 
consider the annexation proposal. (Watson Depo., P• 9-10, 
at R. 827.) Finally, the Plaintiff-Respondent Peter Doenges 
was extensively involved in the hearings on annexation. He 
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prepared and submitted studies and, with others, reviewed 
reports submitted by proponents of annexation. In fact, Mr. 
Doenges testified that his submissions were "fairly voluminous", 
(Doenges Depo., p. 9, at R. .) 
1. No evidence of injury was ever presented to the cou, 
--.; 
On April 17, 1979, Judge Durha1:i granted Plaintiffs' motion 
for a Temporary Restraining Order on the ground that unless 
annexation were enjoined before it was completed, Plaintiffs 
would lose their standing to challenge annexation. No 
evidence was presented at this hearing. 
On May 29, 1979, Judge Croft heard Defendants' 
motions to dismiss the Complaint and to dissolve the Temporary 
Restraining Order. (Partial Transcript of Proceedings of 
May 29, 1979, pp. 4, 14 & 15, at R. 1044, 1053-54.) Judge 
Croft found that the plaintiffs had not stated a claira nor shown 
any irreparable damage as a result of the annexation procedure. 
THE COURT: It simply gets back to, well maybe 
you can state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, but I don't think you have done so yet. 
And therefore, I find difficulty in 
reading into your Complaint a claim upon which 
injunctive relief can be granted. (Partial 
Transcript of Proceedings of May 29, 1979 Hearing, 
P. 2, at R. 1042.) 
THE COURT: Before we get to that, you see, we 
have got to get you into court properly and 
they have challenged the validity of your Complaint. 
Maybe I read more into it than is there. I 
think it can be summed up, as I said before, you 
don't state a claim upon which the relief you 
seek can be granted. (Partial Transcript of 
Proceedings of May 29, 1979 Hearing, p. 4, at 
R. 1043.) 
THE COURT: ... I think that your claim 
for relief under 6S(b) ought to be clearly and 
concisely stated if you are going to rely upon 
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65(b). If you are going to rely upon 65(a), I 
think you have got to do something more than you 
have done to allege irreparable damage to the 
plaintiffs that would justify injunctive relief. (Id., p. 14, at R. 1053.) 
Plaintiff-Respondents filed a Second Amended Complaint 
on June 7, 1979. In this Second Amended Complaint, as suggested 
by the court, the plaintiffs stated two causes of action--the 
first that the petition was defective and that the City Commission 
had acted improperly, and the second that the petition provisions 
of § 10-2-401 violated the equal protection requirements of 
both the Federal and State Constitutions. All claims for 
injunctive relief were dropped fron the Second Amended 
Complaint and there were no allegations whatsoever that any of 
the plaintiffs had been injured in any way. The o::ily claim 
alleged was that the act of annexation would: 
affect the rights of plaintiffs in that lands 
in which plaintiffs hav.e the interest heretofore 
set forth will be subjected, as the result of 
such acts, to the jurisdiction of Salt Lake City, 
including, at least, the jurisdiction to tax and 
assess and to plan and develop. (Plaintiff-
Respondents' Second Amended Complaint, p. 4, at R. 362.) 
This claim for damages was only alleged as a consequence of the 
City Commission's acts of annexation. The Plaintiff-Respondents 
made no claim that the provisions of Section 10-2-401 either 
directly or adversely affected the rights of the Plaintiff, 
except the blanket claim that Plaintiffs had been denied equal 
protection. (Id. p. 4-5, at R. 362-63.) 
All of the parties filed cross motions for summary 
judgment and submitted the issue to the judge after hearing on 
August 9, 1979. No witnesses were offered, no testimony taken 
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except whatever was contained in the depositions and affidavits 
on file. 
At the hearing, Judge Conder also questioned the 
Plaintiffs' claim to damages and asked Mr. Smay, attorney for 
Plaintiffs in which way the Plaintiffs had been injured. The 
only reference in the Complaint or in any of the documents filea 
or argument given to possibility of an injury is the following: 
THE COURT: Thank you. Second question. Under 
Rule 65(a) which is injunctive relief, and this 
is going to come up by rea3ons of the other 
motions in the file, do you claim there is 
irreparable harm caused to the plaintiffs and have 
you pled irreparable harm caused to you to warrant 
the issuance of a preliminary injunction? 
MR. SHAY: Yes, clearly irreparable harT'.1, and 
it is recognized in a number of cases having the 
status of your land in which you're interested 
change from one authority to another counter 
[center] to the city is irreparable harm, if in 
fact it Houldn' t be illegal. ('i'ranscript of 
Proceedings, August 9, 1979, pp. 48-49, at 
R. 1103-04.) 
The right to remain part of the county is not a right protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
There has been no showins of any claimed injury to 
any recognizable right resulting directly from the petition 
provisions of Section 10-2-401. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. The Plaintiff-Respondents do not have Standing 
to Challenge the Constitutionality of Section 10-2-401, 
Utah Code Ann. (Pocket Supp. 1977) as the provisions of 
that Section have not and will not "directly and adversely" 
Infringe on any of their Constitutionally Protected Rights. 
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Neither this Court nor any other court has the pm7er, per 
se, to review and annul acts of the legislature on the 
grounds that they are unconstitutional. That question nay 
be considered only when some direct injury is suffered or 
threatened to be suffered by the one assailing the act. 
The party who invokes the power must be able 
to show, not only that the statute is invalid, 
but that he has sustained or is immediately 
in danger of sustaining some direct injury as 
a result of its enforcement, and not merely 
that he suffers in some indefinite way in 
common with people generally. (Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 
(1923).) 
The controlling question determining standing is whether 
Plaintiff-Respondents "have sustained or are immediately in 
danger of sustaining some direct injury "as a result of the 
statute's enforcement. (Cramp v. Bd. of Public Inst., 368 U.S. 
278, 279 (1961).) 
This being a declaratory judgment action in which the 
requirements for standing are strict, (Tileston v. Ullman, 318 
U.S. 44,45 (1943).), before any court has jurisdiction to 
determine the constitutionality of the statute, it must 
deterDine whether the parties had the requisite standing. 
Plaintiff-Respondents must have suffered or will suffer in fact 
an actual and direct injury as a result of the petition provisions 
of Section 10-2-401 in order to challenge its constitutionality. 
We may once more repeat what has been so 
often said, that one who would strike down 
a state statute as violative of the Federal 
Constitution must show he is within the 
class with r~spect to whom the act is 
unconstitutional, and must show that the 
alleged unconstitutional feature injures 
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him, and so operates as to deprive him of 
rights protected by the Federal Constitution. 
(The Plymouth Coal CompanJ v. Pennsylvania, 
232 U.S. 531, 545 (1913). 
Clearly, Plaintiffs cannot sue for wrongs that do not affect 
them. 
In order that the validity of a state statute 
may be "drawn in question" it must appear that 
the plaintiff in error has a right to draw it 
in question by reason of an interest in the 
litigation which has suffered, or may suffer, 
by the decision of the state court in favor of 
the validity of the statute. (Tyler v. Judges, 
179 U.S. 405, 408 (1900).) 
The issue was squarely addressed by the United Stnu 
Supreme Court in Tileston v. Ullman. There a physician 
filed a declaratory judgment action in the state court to 
determine whether the state statute prohibiting the use of 
drugs or instruments to prevent conception and the giving of 
assistance or counsel in their use is unconstitutional. The 
physician alleged that if the statute was enforced he would 
be prohibited from giving advice concerning the use of 
contraceptives to three patients whose condition of health was 
such that their lives would be endangered by child bearing. 
The United States Supreme Court dismissed the action claiming 
that the plaintiff's life was not in danger and therefore he 
did not have standing. 
We are of the opinion that the proceedings 
in the State Court present no constitutional 
question which appellant has standing to assert. 
The sole constitutional attack upon the statutes 
under the Fourteenth Amendment is confined to 
their deprivation of life--obviously not 
appellant's, but his patients'. There is no 
allegation or proof that appellant's life is 
in danger. His patients are not parties to 
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these proceedings and there is no basis on which 
we_ ca~ sa~ that he has standing to secure an 
adJudication of his patients' constitutional 
right to life, which they do not assert in their 
owr: beh~lf. [cites omitted] No question is 
rais~d i~ the record wit~ respect to the 
~eprivation o~ appellant s liberty or property 
in contravention to the Fourteenth Amendment. 
• • • (Tileston v. Ullr.ian, 318 U.S. 44, at 46.) 
Not only must the plaintiffs personally suffer a 
direct and recognizeable injury, the injury r.iust be pleaded. 
In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429 {1961), the Suprer.ie 
Court refused to consider the constitutional issue rising under 
the First Amendment of a Sunday closing law as that constitu-
tional right had not been alleged in the complaint by the 
particular plaintiffs: 
First, appellants contend here that the statutes 
applicable to Anne Arundel County violate the 
constitutional guarantee of Freedom of Religion 
in that the statutes' effect is to prohibit the 
free exercise of religion in contravention of 
the First Amendment, made applicable to the 
States by the Fourteenth Amendment. But appellants 
allege only economic injury to theraselves; they 
do not allege any infringement of their own 
religious freedoms due to Sunday closing. In fact, 
the record is silent as to what appellants' 
religious beliefs are. Since the general rule 
is that "a litigant may only assert his own 
constitutional rights or immunities," United States 
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, we hold that appellants 
have no standing to raise this contention. 
These principles are dispositive of the action. Plaintiff-
Respondents never pleaded, nor attempted to prove that they had 
suffered a direct injury to a constitutionally protected right 
as a result of the annexation procedure dictated by Section 
10-2-401. The Plaintiffs in their Complaint claim that the 
statute is unconstitutional in: 
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(a) That the annexation procedure limits the 
petition process of an annexation to land owners 
of record on the latest assessment rolls while 
denying to others the right to sign the petition; 
(b) That the requirement that those signing 
the petition include a majority of the property 
owners results in weighted voting; and 
(c) The use of the last assess~ent rolls grants 
a right to individuals who have sold their property 
subsequent to the completion of the rolls to sign 
a petition while denying the opportunity to 
purchasers who purchase the property subsequent to 
the formulation of the latest assessment rolls. 
(Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, p. 5, 
, 13, at R. 363.) 
Plaintiffs argued that "defendant has attempted to impose its 
jurisdiction upon lands in which plaintiffs are interested 
by proceedings taken pursuant to a statute which is unconstitutl 
and void. (Ibid., ~ 14, at R. 363.) 
Thus, the only claimed injury is the changing of 
the status of Plaintiffs' land from being land in the county 
to land in the city. This being true, the only Plaintiffs 
conceivably having standing to assert this injury are the 
Plaintiffs who own property within the area to be annexed--
Doenges, Crockard and Watson. Miles Crockard and Peter 
Doenges, however, had an opportunity to sign the petition or 
refuse to. (Doenges Depo., pp. 4-5, at R. .) Therefore, the 
petition provisions of Section 10-2-401 do not deny them any 
right. "He who is not injured by the operation of a law or 
ordinance cannot be said to be deprived by it of either 
constitutional right or property." (Thomas Cusack Co. v. 
Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 530 (1916).) 
Plaintiff-Respondent Watson, at his deposition, 
alleged that he purchased property within the area to be 
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annexed in approx~nately November, 1978, after the assessment 
rolls were determined. (Watson Depa., p. 4, R. 827.) Therefore, 
his name did not appear and he could not sign the petition. B 
ut, 
Equal Protection does not require perfection (Janes v. Strange, 
407 U.S. 128, 133 (1972).) Mr. Bowen, however, favored 
annexation. He wanted more area included within the annexation. 
(Bowen Depa., pp. 5-6, at R. 
.) His interest was in someone 
else's property. A right he does not have standing to assert. 
Bowen will not be personally injured by the exclusion of 
this area from the city. Further, Mr. Bowen made his opinions 
known at the hearings. Hr. Peterson, a renter, did not have 
his property transferred to city jurisdiction. Thus, he could 
not have suffered this alleged injury. 
The Emigration Improvement District certainly had 
no constitutional right to protect. First, in a letter to the 
court dated July 26, 1979, the Improvement District adnitted 
that annexation would accomplish its purpose in being and asked 
to be removed as a plaintiff. (R.538.) It certainly could 
not be injured if its purposes were being accomplished by 
annexation. And there is certainly no right for a water 
district to vote in any election or as a district to sign any 
petition. Plaintiff-Respondent Bowen lives outside the area 
to be annexed, none of this property would be transferred into 
the city's jurisdiction. He opposed the annexation because 
it did not include the area in which he resides. 
The Plaintiffs did not carry their burden or even 
ic1akc• .my effort to show that the use of the latest assessment 
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rolls created an invidious distinction. (See, infra, at 40.) 
There must be a way to finally determine potential petitioners 
so that the City Commission can finally know whether it can 
act. A city commission cannot take action unless the requisite 
number of signatures are on a petition. Without some standard 
of establishing finality in ownership, it would be impossible 
for the commissioners to determine whether, on the date of 
voting on an annexation petition, the requisite number of 
signatures were present. The Commission is not equipped to 
review every parcel of land to determine property ownership 
on the very day of the vote. Petitioners also have a right 
to know whether their petition is valid, and with whom they 
must deal to petition a city cor.imission to commence determinatio: 
of the advisability of annexation. The latest assessment rolls 
are the best deterr.iiners. 
B. Equal Protection is not Violated by Limiting the 
Petition Process Trig,gering a Hearing to Consider a Petition 
for Annexation to Real Property Ownen. where the Hearing Process 
Grants to all Interested Individuals an Opportunity to be Heard 
on the Annexation Petition. 
1. Plaintiff-Respondents have neither plead~rn 
proven a direct and adverse infringement on any constitutionall: 
protected right. 
In this sense, the concept of standing focuses 
on the party seeking relief, rather than on 
the precise nature of the relief sought. See 
Flast v. Cohen, supra, 392 U.S., at 99-100._ 
The decisions of this court have also made it 
clear that something more than an "adversary 
interest" is necessary to confer standing. 
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There must, in addition, be some connection 
between the official action challenged and some 
legally ~rotected interest of the party challenging 
that action. See Flast v. Cohen supra at 
101-106. (Jenkins v. McKeethan '395 U.S. 411 
423 (1969).) , , 
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Section 10-2-401 
of the Utah Code denies the "franchise to other persons 
substantially affected by and interested in the annexation.'' 
(Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, p. 5 ~ 13A, at R. 363.) 
The right infringed would be the right to be heard. But such 
is not the effect of this provision. 
Section 10-2-401 provides that a majority of landovmers 
within a given area may request, by way of petition, that a 
city commission investigate and determine the advisability 
of the annexation of that territory to the municipality. This 
petition does not determine whether annexation will take 
place. It is merely a triggering device which triggers 
consideration of the proposal by the body legislated by the 
state to make that determination. Immediately upon receiving 
a valid petition, the city commission must investigate and 
consider the petition. This investigation and consideration 
includes public hearings. In the present case numerous 
public hearings were held wherein all interested citizens, 
including the Plaintiffs and their representative, were 
allowed to participate and to make their views known. (Supra, 
at 9-13.) The determination of annexation was made by the 
City Commission only after the opinions and views of all 
parties who had availed themselves of the opportunity to 
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speak had been heard. The effect of Section 10-2-401 is to 
grant to everyone the equal right to be heard on any proposed 
annexation during the hearing process. 
It is clear that the constitutional validity of a 
statute must be determined by its natural and reasonable 
effects. 
With respect to these contentions, it is 
enough to say that in passing upon constitutional 
questions the Court has regard to substance and not 
mere matters of form, and that, in accordance 
with familiar principles, the statute must be 
tested by its operation and effect. (Near v. 
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931).) 
In Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472 (1932), 
Chief Justice Hughes explained exactly how an alleged denial 
of equal protection must be weighed by the court. 
Discrimination, like interstate commerce itself, 
is a practical concept. We must deal in this 
matter, as in others with substantial distinctions 
and real injuries. (Id., at 481.) 
The same considerations, with respect to discrim-
ination applied to the claim that the statute 
in question volates the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In determining whether there is a denial of 
equal protection of the laws by such taxation, 
we r.rust look to the fairness and reasonableness 
of its purposes and practical operation. . .• 
(Id., at 482.) 
Looking at the purposes and practical operation, of Section 
10-2-401, it is obvious that the plaintiffs in this case 
have suffered no real injuries. They had, and availed thernselv 
of the opportunity to be heard. See pages 6-13, supra. 
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The record clearly shows that the Plaintiff-Respondents 
have not been denied equal protection, have not been denied 
an equal right to be heard on the annexation provisions. What 
has happened is that the Plaintiff-Respondents have lost in 
the political process and are now attempting judicially to reverse 
what the legislature lawfully has accomplished. In Thompson v. 
Whitley, 344 F. Supp. 480 (E.D.N.C. 1972), a similar situation 
occured. Here, under a statutory annexation scheme, residents 
within the area to be annexed were denied the right to vote 
on an annexation referendum. In finding that such a scheme 
was constitutional, the district court explained: 
• • • thus right to vote in the referendum here 
does not relate except indirectly to participation 
in representative government. Indeed, the newly 
annexed citizens brought into the township over 
their protests may thereafter vote in township 
elections and have their votes counted fully to 
influence township decisions---including future 
annexations and perhaps even de-annexations. 
(Id., at 484.) 
The Utah statute grants more. 
2. Plaintiff-Respondents have not been denied 
any constitutionally protected right to vote. 
In Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir. 1978), a 
case squarely on point, the Fourth Circuit held that a law under 
which the governing body of a city may annex an area by 
resolution upon the filing of a petition signed by a certain 
percentage of the landowners within that area does not deny 
equal protection to anyone. The South Carolina statute in 
question authorized the 8overning body of any city, upon the 
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...., 
filing of a petition by seventy-five percent or more of the 
freeholders in any area contiguous to the city requesting 
annexation, to annex such area. The registered voter denied the 
right to vote on the annexation filed suit alleging that this 
denial violates voters' rights under the equal protection clause. 
In denying the claim, relying on Hunter v. Pittsbur8, 
207 U.S. 161 (1907). the Fourth Circuit held that no one was 
denied the right to vote as the decision was made by the 
city's governing body. The court held that the petitioning 
process "involves no election" (Id., at 425) and therefore the 
Court expressly rejected the application of Kramer v. Union Scho:. 
District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) and Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 
701 (1969), (Id., at 424), cases relied on by the Plaintiff-
Respondents in the court below. Where no one is granted the 
right to vote on an annexation "there is no basis for an equal 
protection claim." (Berry, supra, at 424; See also, Citizens 
Comm. to Opp. Annex. v. City of Lynchburg, Va., 400 F.Supp. 
68, modified on other grounds, 528 F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1975), 
~denied, 423 U.S. 1043 (1976).) 
The procedure examined by the Fourth Circuit in Berry 
is precisely the procedure mandated by Section 10-2-401. There 
is no election. Upon the petition of a majority of the land-
owners, the city commission may annex contiguous areas upon 
adoption of an appropriate resolution. There is no basis for 
an equal protection claim. 
This Court reached the same conclusion in Freeman v. 
Centerville City, et al., No. 15904 (Utah Sup. Ct. September 
21, 1979.) In Freeman, Plaintiff's property was annexed to 
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annexed to the City of Centerville by an ordinance passed by 
that municipality. Freeman made the exact same claim of injury 
as the Plaintiffs in this case. The Plaintiff opposed annexation 
on the ground that Section 10-2-401 was unconstitutional. The 
Court disagreed. 
Plai~tiff specifically claims a deprivation 
of his property because annexation to a different 
jurisdiction will significantly alter his property 
rights in connection with such matters as annexation 
zoning, and water rights. (Id., at 2.) ' 
This Court found that the legislature was under no legal requirement 
to provide for an election by those affected by the proposed 
annexation. (Id., at 3-4.) The Supreme Court concluded, after 
reviewing the statute, 
We find no basis in the Constitution for 
making the general annexation process subject to 
conditions beyond those stated in the statute. 
(Id., at 4.) 
The Court went on to explain that the annexing municipality, 
in considering a petition, was required to consider all 
interests involved and it was not bound by the petition. 
It is, howev~r. the duty and responsibility 
of the annexing municipality to exercise the 
prudence and sound judgment that will prevent 
inappropriate annexations and assure that they 
are in the public interest. The governing 
body of the municipality must take into account 
not only the welfare of the petitioners, but also 
the welfare of those who reside within its 
established borders in determining whether to 
pass an ordinance of annex~tion. Acco7dingly! a 
municipality is not bound in the exer7ise of its 
judgment by a petition, even though si~ned by a 
majority of landowners, to pass an ordinance 
necessary to complete annexation. Cottonwood 
City Electors v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Cornrn'rs, 
28 Utah 2d 121, 499 P.2d 270 (1972). (Id., at 5.) 
Since no one voted for or against annexation except the City 
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Commission, no group could claim that it had been denied equal 
protection. 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Hall explained that 
as the plaintiff had actual notice of the hearing, and was in 
attendance, he therefore had no standing to challenge the 
lack of notice. The situation is similar here. Plaintiff-
Respondents all had notice of the hearing, all participated 
in the hearings and made their opinions known, they now have 
no standing to challenge the process. As explained in 
Freeman, the petitioning process is not the same as an 
election. It is only the triggering process for the considerati~ 
of annexation and therefore the equal protection requirements 
for a direct election do not apply. 
As this Court recognized in Freeman, the annexation 
procedure of Section 10-2-401 provides first that a majority 
of the landowners living within an area desirin8 annexation 
must request of the annexing territory that it consider the 
prospects of annexation. This petition is merely a triggeri~ 
device and not an election. 
In enacting § 10-2-401, the Legislature 
established a means for annexation which calls 
for the consent of both the annexing municipality 
and a majority of the property owners in the area 
seeking annexation. The initiation of the 
annexation process by petition is not the 
equivalent of an election nor need it be. It 
is only the triggering process for the concerned 
municipality to consummate the annexation procedure 
by exercising its legislative power if it deems it 
appropriate to do so. (Freeman v. Centerville Cit 
et al., No. 15904 Utah Sup. Ct. Septera er 
1979).) (Emphasis supplied) 
This was the point missed by Plaintiff-Respondents and the 
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court below. In reliance on constitutional requirements 
established by cases where the election was the final determina-
tive act, the lower court held that a "triggering" petition 
was equivalent and required the same protections. This simply 
is not correct. 
The United States Supreme Court has discussed this 
same issue in Concerned Citizens of Southern Ohio v. Pine 
Creek Conservancy District, 429 U.S. 651 (1977). Under the 
Ohio statute in question, the filing of a petition signed by 
a certain percentage of the owners of land located within the 
the area desiring to form a conservancy district triggered the 
forr.1ation of a conservancy court. It was the conservancy court's 
responsibility first to evaluate the desirability of establishing 
the proposed district and then to decide whether one should 
be formed. The petition of the landowners did not create the 
district, but only initiated consideration of the matter. 
Following this process, in the Concerned Citizens case, the 
conservancy court determined that a conservancy district ought 
to be established. 
Parties objecting to the formation of the district, 
landowners and non-landowners alike, argue that the procedure 
violated the Coustitution, inter alia, on the ground that 
residents of towns opposing formation of the district were 
denied equal protection because they were excluded from the 
petition process. The three-judge district court rejected 
plaintiff's claims without consideration. The Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded Per Curium, stating that the three-
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judge court needed to evaluate each of the constitutional 
challenges. 
In dissent, Justices Rhenquist, Powell and Stevens 
argued that this would be a waste of time, for following 
correct authority the lower court would have arrived at the 
same result. Dealing specifically with the question of the 
equal protection requirement of an individual's right to be 
heard in opposition, the three agreed: 
To the extent the claim here protests the 
"discrimination" against the freeholders in a 
town whose governing body signs the petition, 
in that they "were deprived of the right to oppose 
the district," it is sir.iply wrong on the facts . 
• • • Rather, opposing freeholders in such towns 
remain as free as opposing freeholders in towns 
where petitions are circulated, to appear before 
the conservancy court and "object to the organiza-
tion and incorporation of said district. ••. 11 
[cite omitted] They are entitled to no more 
under the Constitution. (Id., at 658) (Emphasis 
added.) -
Other state courts reach the same conclusion. The S~ 
Court of New Mexico found constitutional an annexation provisim 
excluding the petition process to landowners in Torres v. Villa_& 
of Capitan, 92 N.M. 64, 582 P.2d 1277 (1978). The statute provi 
that a city may annex contiguous territory whenever a petition 
signed by the owners of a majority of the number of acres within 
that area is filed. A majority of the landowners and owners of 
more than 50 percent of the area to be annexed filed a petition 
for annexation. After consideration the annexation was approvea, 
A suit was filed challenging the annexation on the ground that 
the exclusion of non-landowners from the petition and the 
requirement that petitioners own more than 50 percent of the 
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land within the area to be annexed violated the equal protection 
clause of the Constitution. The New Mexico Supreme Court 
disagreed. The Court could not equate the petition procedure 
triggering consideration by a municipality of an annexation proposal 
with an individual's voting rights. (Torres v. Village of 
Capitan, 92 N.M. 64, 582 P.2d 1277, 1282 (1978).) 
We hold that petitioning for annexation 
o~ land in this case is not a fundamental voting 
right and that §14-7-17, supra, is constitutional. 
(Id., at 1283.) 
In so holding, the court explained that these petition procedures 
do not involve elections and therefore do not infringe upon 
the fundamental right to vote." (Ibid.) 
The California Supreme Court also squarely met the 
issue in Curtis v. Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County, 
501 P.2d 537 (Cal. 1972). The California statute being 
challenged -- a municipal incorporation statute -- contained two 
provisions separately considered uy the court. One was a 
determination of the constitutionality of the same procedure as 
that mandated by the Utah Code Section 10-2-401, except for the 
numbers required. The California provision in question required: 
Proceedings for municipal incorporation 
were initiateJ by the "filing with the board of 
supervisors ••• a petition signed by at least 
25 percent of the qualified signers, representing 
at least 25 percent of the assessed value of the 
land included in the proposed city limits." (Id., 
at 540 n. 4.) 
("Qualified signer" was defined as the "owner of an interest 
in fee" or the purchaser of land under a written agreement. (Ibid.).; 
Excluded were all r,esidents who own no land "although these 
persons ad~ittedly are also financially and politically interested. • 
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(Id., at 545.) 
The California Supreme Court found that limiting 
the petition process to landowners did not deny non-landowners 0 
their right to be heard. It was not a denial of equal protectioi 
As the court explained: 
30. Section 34303 provides that proceedings before 
the board of supervisors are initiated by a 
petition signed by at least 25 percent of the land-
owners representing at least 25 percent of the 
assessed value of land. (See fn. 4, supra.) 
We perceive no constitutional objection in 
permitting a group composed of 25 percent or oore 
of the landowners, whether or not they represent 
25 percent of the value of land, to initiate 
incorporation proceedings, and consequently we find 
no constitutional impediment to the board of 
supervisors acting on the petition for incorpora-
tion of Rancho Palos Verdes •••• (Id., at 553 n. 30.) 
31. Our holding that the protest procedure of 
section 34311 is unconstitutional does not leave 
the nonresident or corporate landowner bereft of 
statutory protection. He may appear before the 
local agency formation coomssion to oppose incor-
poration and request exclusion from the proposed 
city(§ 54795). These comoissions may, and often 
do, disapprove unsound incorporation proposals 
or require the revision of proposed boundaries. 
The landowner may again appear before the board of 
supervisors to oppose incorporatin or request 
exclusion(§§ 34311, 34315) •••• 
The difference between these remedies and the 
protest procedure of section 34311 is that they 
confer upon the landowner no right to veto incorpora· 
tion, but extend to him only the opportunity to 
persu~de a public body that nonincorporation, 
exclusion, or lower taxation is in the public 
interest. (Id., n. 31.) 
The petition procedure in Utah, South Carolina, New 
Mexico and California initiate hearings on the advisability 
of annexation. In no case is the petition determinative. 
Plaintiffs had no right to vote on the annexation proposal. 
Dealing specifically with claims similar to 
those of plaintiffs, the courts have long held 
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that there is no absolute right under the due 
proces~ 7lause to vote on a proposed alteration 
of p~litical boundaries. (Dozle v. Municiyal 
Comm n, 340 F.Supp. 841, 847.I D.Minn. 1972 .) 
of See also, Hunter v. Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161, 178, 179 (1907); 
or Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 F.Supp. 1397 (D.Colo. 
1970); aff'd, 399 U.S. 901 (1970). 
-
The United States Supreme Court has expressly stated 
and reaffirmed that equal protection and due process do not 
apply to annexation procedures that only trigger hearings and 
a final decision is subsequently made, not compelled by the 
petitioning process this decision being made by a separate body. 
3. There is no constitutionally protected right 
to maintain a person's property within or without a political 
subdivision of the state. 
In Hunter v. Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161 (1907), the 
United States Suprerne Court explained the "settled doctrines" 
regarding a state's statutory authority over annexation. 
Although the inhabitants and property owners may 
by such changes suffer inconvenience, and their 
property may be lessened in value by the burden 
of increased taxation, or for any other reason, 
they have no right by contract or otherwise in 
the unaltered or continued existence of the 
corporation or its powers, and there is nothing 
in the Federal Constitution which protects them 
from these injurious consequences. The power is 
in the State and those who legislate for the State 
are alone responsible for any unjust or oppressive 
exercise of it. (Hunter v. Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161, 
178-79 (1907) .) 
Although pronounced in 1907, the principle remains unaltered by 
1 that Court and repeatedly followed. 
1see, ~· Board of Sup. of Harrison Co., Iowa v. 
Bd. of Sup:-oI Pottawattomie Ct., Iowa, 289 U.S. 708 (1932); 
~f Hillsboro v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 255 U.S. 562 (1920); City 
~New-York v. McEntee, 263 U.S. 698 (1923). 
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In affirl"ling a disnissal of a property owners' action 
to have a municipal annexation ordinance declared invalid, the 
Tenth Circuit, relyinr, on the Suprel"le Court's opinion in 
Hunter, concluded that neither federal due process nor the 
concept of equal protection was available to the plaintiffs. 
Neither the due process clause nor the concept 
of equal protection is available to persons seekinb 
to obstruct the ordinary and necessary exercise 
of a state's political functions .•.• (Internatioo~ 
Harvester Co. v. Kansas Gitt' 308 F.2d 35, 39 
(10th Cir. 1962), cert. den d, 371 U.S. 948 (1963).) 
The Sixth Circuit, again relying on Hunter, in ~ 
Edison Co. v. East China Township School Dist. No. 3, 37U F.2d 
225 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. den'd, 389 U.S. 932 (1967), in 
affirming the lower court, concluded: 
The District Court, relying principally on 
Hunter v. City of Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 
40, 52 L. Ed. 151 (1907) for the proposition that 
"[a]ny alteration of municpal boundaries is a matter 
within the complete discretion of the state and not 
confined by any rights secured by the federal constitu: 
held that the annexation procedure followed was a 
lesislative matter not justiciable under the due proc< 
or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendmer. 
(Id., at 228.) 
In East China Township, the plaintiffs sought a declaration tha: 
the annexation of two larger school districts to the school 
district in which they owned property violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Plaintiffs argued that 
the statute was unconstitutional because the individual plaiAfU 
were denied the right to vote on the annexation proposal. The 
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal "because 
plaintiffs have faile<l to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted." 
-38-
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In Hammonds v. City of Corpus Christi, 343 F.2d 162 
(5th Cir.), cert denied, 382 U.S. 837 (1965) the Fifth Circuit 
reached a similar conclusion. In Hammonds plaintiffs sued to 
enjoin Corpus Christi from asserting any control over the alleged 
annexed territory, alleging that the annexation violated the due 
process clause of the Federal Constitution. The district court 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction inter alia on the ground 
that "(l) the annexation of lands to a city has been held, without 
exception, to be purely a political matter entirely within the 
power of the State Lesislature to regulate." The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed. 
The appellants rely upon many cases dealing 
with the protection afforded by the 14th Amendnent, 
but none which specifically relate to an annexation 
situation. The judge and appellee rely upon 
Hunter v. City of Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161, 28 
S.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed. 151 (1907). Although the judge 
quoted at leneth from that opinion, appellants neither 
cite the case nor make any attempt to distinguish it. 
The Tenth Circuit, in International Harvester Co. v. 
Kansas City, 308 F.2d 35, also cited with approval 
and quoted from the Hunter case. 
We find no error or fault in the opinion and 
judgment of the district court, and they are 
affirmed. (Id., at 164.) 
Annexation is a political question--this district court lacked 
power to review the City Commission's actions. 
Although we may disagree with the mode of 
annexation or annexations themselves, the remedy of 
those aggrieved is not in the cour~s, but in the 
State Legislature. (Hammonds v. City of Corpus 
Christi, Texas, 226 F.Supp. 456 (S.D. Tex. 1964).) 
None of the Plaintiff-Respondents either directly or 
personally have been injured in areas protected by the 
Constitution. They had no risht to vote and their right to be 
heard has been preserved and exercised through their participa-
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tion in the hearings. "They are entitled to no more under the 
constitution." 
Municipal corporations are political subdivision 
of the state, created as convenient agencies for 
exercising such of the governmental powers of the 
state as may be entrusted to them. • • • Although 
the inhabitants and property owners rnay by such 
changes [changes in boundaries of municipalities) 
suffer inconvenience and their property may be 
lessened in value by increased taxation, or for 
any reason, they have no right by contract or 
otherwise in the unaltered or continued existence 
of the corporation or its powers, and there is 
nothing in the Federal Constitution which protects 
them froin these injurious consequences. (Hunter v. 
Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907).) 
It has been continually reaffirmed that the right to remain 
outside a municipality or to be included within a municipality 
is not a right protected under the Constitutuion. 
We find no right of annexation available to 
anyone, owners or residents, regardless of 
economic status. (Wilkerson v. City of Coralville, 
478 F.2d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 1973).) 
As the Supreme Court explained in Hunter, 
The state • • • at its pleasure ••• may expand 
or contract the territorial area, unite the whole 
or a part of it with another municipality, repeal 
the charter and destroy the corporation. All this 
may be done conditionally or unconditionally with 
or without the consent of the citizens or even 
against their protest. (Hunter v. Pittsburg, 
207 U.S. at 179.) 
There is no constitutional right to maintain ones property 
within or without a municipality. 
C. Plaintiff-Respondents Failed to Sustain their 
Burden of Showing that the State did not have a Compelling I~ 
in Limiting the Petitioning Provisions of the Utah Annexation 
Statute to " ••• a majority of the owners of real propertyJ 
shown by the last assessment rolls, 
within the Area to be Annexed. 
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The test for whether a state's statutory scheme 
violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
is whether the classification drawn is reasonable in light of 
its purpose. "The presumption of reasonableness is with 
the state." (Salsbury v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 553 (1954).) 
It is ••• a maxim of constitutional law that a 
legislature is presumed to have acted within 
constitutional limits, upon full knowledge of the 
facts, and with the purpose of promoting the interests 
of the people as a whole, and courts will not 
lightly hold that an act duly passed by the 
legislature was one in enactment of which it has 
transcended its power. (Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
Railroad Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 104-105 (1898). 
This presumption of reasonableness means this: 
[T]he burden of establishing the unconstitu-
tionality of a statute rests on him who assails 
it, and ••• courts may not declare a legislative 
discrimination invalid unless, viewed in light of 
facts made known or generally assumed, it is of 
such a character to preclude the assumption that 
the classification rests upon some rational basis 
within the knowledge and experience of the 
legislators. A statutory discrimination uill 
not be set aside as a denial of equal protection 
of the laws if any state of facts reasonably 
may be conceived to justify it. (Metropolitan 
Casualty Insurance Co. v. Brownel, 294 U.S. 580, 
584 (1934) .) 
This Court does not view this any differently: 
In addressing the question of constitu-
tionality of this act of the legislature, 
we bear in mind the fundamental precepts: 
that all presumptions favor validity; the courts 
will strike down such an act with reluctance 
and only where that is clearly necessary; and 
that in case of uncertainty the act should be 
construed so that it will be constitutional 
whenever that reasonably can be done. (Great 
Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Co., 
18 Utah 2d 45, 414 P.2d 963 (Utah 1966).) 
ln }:hompson v. Whitley, 344 F.Supp. 480 (E.D.N.C. 1972), the 
plaintiff in that case argued that the presumptions of constitu-
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tionality and reasonableness were not applicable where a 
statutory scheme denied them a fundamental right--the right 
to vote on an annexation. Al though the court in Thompson agreeo 
that the plaintiffs "suffer discrimination by this statutory 
scheme", (Id., at 484.) it disagreed that voting on annexation 
was a "fundamental right" and would not apply the stricter 
standards of review. (Ibid.) 
In this case, although the Plaintiff-Respondents 
claim that they and others in different circumstances and 
situations have been denied equal protection because they 
have not been allowed to participate in the triggering 
process. They have done nothing to show that this distinction 
is invidious. It was the Plaintiff-Respondents' burden to 
show that the classification violated the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and this burden they have not sustained. 
Although it may not be perfect, the annexation 
ordinance establishes safeguards--those entitled to petition 
are those individuals primarily affected by the proposed 
annexation. The safeguards are embodied in the requirement 
that the signers must be property owners appearing on the 
last assessment rolls. This requirement establishes a 
method of determining the true owner, it establishes finality. 
This assures that there is some relationship between the 
petitioners and the tax burden. 
The real property owners have the greatest interest 
in the property rights affected. They will be directly 
affected by increased taxes or required improvements such as 
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sewage connections. These costs may or may not be passed on 
to renters. And the real property owners will be the ones 
most benefited as the value of the property may increase 
with the advent of city services. Fire insurance will 
decrease as there will be a fire station closer to the 
property. Clean running water will be available. Thus, 
there is a basis for distinguishing between property owners 
and non-property owners. The classification is founded 
upon a reasonable distinction, and although this Court nay 
have a better idea that is not the standard for finding a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Torres v. Village of 
Capitan, 92 N.W. 64, 582 P.2d 1277, 1283 (1978).) 
D. After a Notice of Appeal is Filed, the District 
Court had no Jurisdiction over the Matter to File Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
The law is clear that once a notice of appeal has been 
filed, the district court loses jurisdiction of the matter 
except to entertain motions necessary to facilitate the appeal 
which are pending at the time the notice of appeal was filed. 
On August 20, 1979, Judge Dean Conder of the Utah 
State Third Judicial Court entered his Memorandum Decision on 
the cross-motions for summary judgment which were argued before 
the court on August 9, 1979. In the order, the court held that 
Section 10-2-401 was unconstitutional, therefore, the court 
granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Nowhere in 
the Memorandum Decision did the court request the filing of 
Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law. As this Court is 
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well aware, where there is no request for Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on a motion for summary judgment where 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are not required by 
statute, it is presumed that the court did not intend to 
enter any, and that the Memorandum Decision was the final decisi: 
Plaintiffs appealed before specifically 
designated findings and conclusions were 
entered by the trial court, allegedly in the 
interest of time. Neither of the parties 
challenged this on appeal; indeed, both treat 
the memorandum decision as the court's final 
disposition of the case. Generally, where no 
request has been made for findings of fact, the 
presumption is that the trial court found all 
facts necessary to support its order and 
judgment. (Seal v. Ma¥leton City, No. 15948 
(Utah Sup.Ct. 27 July 979).) 
Due to the statutory requirements that the notice of appeal 
be filed within 10 days, on August 27, 1979, these Defendants, 
filed a notice of appeal (R. 748-49) in the district court fw 
the Third Judicial District. Eight days later, plaintiffs 
submitted Findin~s of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
to the Court. Two days after that a second unrequested set of 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were submitted. These 
were signed September 6, 1979. 
The law is clear, that once a notice of appeal has 
been filed the district court is without authority to enter 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The trial court's 
jurisdiction ceased upon perfection of an appeal and jurisdictW 
of the Utah Supreme Court attaches. 
It is the general rule 
loses jurisdiction while an 
except in regard to matters 
furtherance of the appeal. 
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510 P.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. Ariz. 1973)· National 
American Life Insurance Co. v. Baxter, 385 P.2d 
956 (Sup. Ct. N.M. 1963).) 
Whenever an appeal is perfected • • • it stays all 
~urther proceedings in the court below upon the 
Judgment or order appealed fro1n, or upon matters 
embraced therein. • • but the court below may 
proceed upon any other matters embraced in the 
action and not affected by the order appealed 
from. 
The perfectin of an appeal is completed 
when the formalities prescribed by the Rules on 
Appeal are complied with, and "stays all further 
proceedings in the court below" since jurisdiction 
is thence forth vested in the appellate court. 
(Navarro v. Lippold, 195 P.2d 543 (D. Ct. of App. 
Cal. 1948).) 
This applies to the entry of findings of fact and conclusions 
of law after a notice of appeal has been filed. 
In Mirabal v. Robert E. McKee General 
Contractor, Inc., 74 N.JI. 455, 394 P.2d 851 
(1964), we held that the trial court properly 
refused to pass upon requested findings and 
conclusions filed after the filing of the 
notice of appeal, because the trial court had 
lost jurisdiction to do so. It follows logically 
therefrom that the trial court in the present 
case lacked authority to enter findings and 
conclusions 19 days after the filing of the 
notice of appeal and over a month and a half 
after the entry of judgment. (Universit~ of 
Albuquerque v. Barrett, (86 N.M. 794), 5 8 P.2d 
207, 209 (1974).) 
Likewise, the district court in this case lacked authority to 
enter findings and conclusions 10 days after the filing of a 
notice of appeal and almost a month after the entry of judgment. 
E. The Court Erred in Failing to Grant Defendant-
~pellants' Motions for Summary Judgment and Dissolve the 
Temporary Restraining Order. 
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1. Annexation is a political matter wholly 
within the power of the Legislature to regulate. 
As this Court recently recognized in Freeman, supra, 
The power to change or modify municipal 
boundaries is a legislative function, and as long 
as the statutory process is complied with, the 
courts will not generally interfere with the 
legislative prerogative, even though a person's 
property by becoming subject to a different 
jurisdiction may be subject to different rules, 
obligations, or assessments. Bradshaw v. Beaver 
City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 493 P.2d 643 (1972); see 
also In Re Town of West Jordan, 7 Utah 2d 391, 
326 P.2d 105 (1958); Application of Peterson, 
92 Utah 212, 66 P.2d 1195 (1937); Plutus Mining 
Co. v. Orme, 76 Utah 286, 289 P.2d 132 (1930); 
Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 1 
(1899). Cf. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 
U.S. 161 (1907); Dillon on Municipal Corporations 
(5th Ed.) 617, §355. (Freeman, suµra, at 3.) 
A court's role in reviewing decisions of governing bodies of 
municipalities in annexation cases is limited by the political 
nature of those proceedings. In an action to restrain the 
County Commissioners of Juab County from exerting authority 
over territory segregated for a municipality, this Court 
explained: 
In view of the fact, however, that the changing 
of the territorial limits of a city is primarily a 
legislative function, courts are bound to confine 
the e::.::ercise of the pm1er conferred upon then by the. 
Legislature within the expressed or necessarily i~W 
language of the act so conferring such power. (~ 
Mininr co. v. Orme, 76 Uta!. 286, 289 P.132, 135 
(1930 • ) 
Further, courts are without authority to decide the "propriety" 
or the "desirability" of a particular annexation. 
Annexation is a legislative function which under 
the constitutional separation of powers cannot be 
delegated to the courts except for this narrow f~ct 
finding determination. The court has no discretionar 
power to determine whether the proposal is good or 
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bad, wise or unwise. (Citl of Clinton v. Owners of 
Property, 191 N.W.2d 671, 77 (Iowa 1971.) 
The function of the judiciary is merely to make a determination 
as to whether the conditions prescribed by the legislature for 
annexation have been met. The political and economic advisability 
of annexation, and the policy questions involved in the 
proble~ of municipal expansion, are to be determined solely 
by the legislative branch and the municipalities, if the power 
is so delegated. 
The courts are and should be reluctant to 
intrude into the prerogative of the legislative 
branch of government, and will interfere with such 
action only if it plainly appears that it is so 
lacking in propriety and reason that it must be 
deemed capricious and arbitrary, or is in excess of 
the authority of the legislative body. (Bradshaw v. 
Beaver City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 493 P.2d 643, 645 (1972). 
See, also, Child v. City of Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 
184 (Utah, 1975); Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 226 P.2d 
127 (Utah 1950).) 
This Court explained this principle in Tygesen v. 
Magna Water Co., 226 P.2d 127 (Utah 1950). Tygesen, was 
an action for a writ of prohibition, prohibiting the defendants 
from issuing and selling general obligation bonds. Under the 
authority of Chapter 24, Laws of Utah 1949, the board of county 
commissioners in each county in the State was empowered to 
establish improvement districts for the purpose of operating 
systems for supply, treatment and distribution of water; and 
systems for the collection, treatment, and disposition of sewage. 
Under this authority, the Magna Improvement District was formed. 
Plaintiffs sought to prohibit the Magna Water Coopany from 
1ar issuing bonds pursuant to the authority of the act on the ground 
that the County Commission acted beyond its constitutional and 
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statutory authority. Further, the plaintiffs argue that as 
the act did not provide for review by the courts, it violated 
sections 7 and 11 of Article I of the Utah State Constitution, 
the Due Process Clauses. This Court held that the acts of 
municipalities or quasi-municipalities, when done within 
the powers given by statute, are not subject to review by courts 
unless manifest abuse of those powers is evident. 
The governmental acts of quasi-municipalities 
are like those of true municipalities, and when a 
municipality acts within the powers given it by 
statute, its acts are not subject to review by 
courts unless there is a manifest abuse of those 
powers or unless such right to review is granted by 
statute. (Id., at 132.) 
This Court held that the Act did not violate due process because 
the provisions of the Act gave "ample opportunity to interested 
owners to protect their right and to prevent the formation of 
such district where the owners of the majority of the real 
property based on the assessed valuation thereof, object." (!£ .. 
at 133.) 
Only recently this Court, in Child v. City of 
Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184 (Utah 1975), had before it the questio 
as to whether a court could examine the notives, purposes and 
reasonableness of city council action. In Child, the real 
property owners within an area to be annexed by Spanish Fork 
sought declaratory judgment that the city's requirements for 
annexation were improper. Specifically, plaintiffs appealed to 
this Court, arguing, (1) that the action of the City Council 
was beyond its powers; and that it was arbitrary aud unreaso~ 
able; and (2) that it violated plaintiff's constitutional 
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rights to equal protection of the laws. This Court affirmed 
the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint 
and explained: 
Ce~ta~n ~rinciples.are applicable in considering 
the plaintiff s contentions. The first is that a 
determination of city boundaries is a legislative 
function, which is performed by its governing body. 
The second logically follows therefrom: That in 
carrying out that duty the city council is endowed 
with broad discretion to make decisions and determine 
policies which it thinks will best fulfill its 
responsibilities. Consequently, as in all legislative 
matters, courts are reluctant to interfere therewith; 
and do so only when the decisions or actions are clearly 
outside the authority of the governing body, or 
are so wholly unreasonable or unjust that they must 
be deemed capricious and arbitrary in adversely 
affecting someone's rights. (Id., at 186.) 
In Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 493 P.2d 643 (Utah 
1972), plaintiffs, all resi<lents of Beaver City, sought to 
enjoin the annexation of a tract uf about 21 acres of land 
which was north of the city and helonged to the Interstate 
Development Company. Plaintiffs contended that the annexation 
was arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious and not done in 
accordance with law and the prerogatives of the defendant 
City Council. The trial court granted defendant's motion 
for summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs claimed that the annexation was an unlawful 
act of the City Council. In response to this claim, the 
district court held: 
The court finds that even if the facts set forth 
in the First Cause of Action were determined to be 
true it would be outside the scope of authority of 
this' court to make a ruling or determinat~on oi:i matters 
that are within the discretion of the legislative 
authorities and mayor of Beaver City. (Id., at 645.) 
All other allegations of the complaint were similarly disposed 
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of by the district court. This Court affirmed, explaining: 
The determination of the boundaries.of a city, 
what rnay or may not be encompassed therein, includi~ 
annexation or severance is a legislative function 
to be performed by the governing body of the city. 
The courts are and should be reluctant to intrude 
into the prerogative of the legislative branch of 
government, and will interfere with such action only 
if it plainly appears that it is so lacking in 
propriety and reason that it must be deemed capricious 
and arbitrary, or is in excess of the authority of 
the legislative body. (Ibid.) 
The law is clear in Utah. The determination of the 
boundaries of a municipality and the reasons for a city's 
decision to annex adjacent territory are beyond the scope of 
judicial review. 
Plaintiff-Respondents in this action asked the 
district court to deterrnine the propriety of the City 
Connnission's action, to reweigh and to re-evaluate the 
evidence before the City CoTtU:iission, and to determine whether 
that action, in view of that Court's economic and social 
theory, was reasonable or wise. Such an inquiry is beyond t~ 
scope of that court's jurisdiction. 
2. There was no evidence offered that the acts 
of the City Commission in approving annexation were either 
arbitrary or capricious. 
At the hearing on Plaintiff-Respondents motion for 
preliminary injunction and the Defendant-Appellees motion to 
dismiss, Judge Croft explained to the plaintiffs just exactly 
what had to be done if the court was to review the acts of 
the City Commission. 
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TH~ COURT: Secondly, you are attempting to 
bring before the Court the procee<lin~s to date 
before the Board of City Commissione~s asking this 
Co~rt tu rule that what they have done to date is 
void and.contrary to law. Now, isn't that what 
your claim for relief is? 
MR. SMAY: 
THE COURT: 
more than 
up to the 
order. 
That is right. 
Certainly, we cannot do anything 
review the action of the City Commission 
time Judge Durham issued a restraining 
MR. SMAY: What those actions were is a matter 
of evidence which can be presented. 
THE COURT: Which can be presented by bringing the 
record of the proceeding before the Court on an 
extraordinary writ. (Partial Transcript of 
Proceedings, May 29, 1979, at 3-4.) 
This was never done. When the issue was submitted on summary 
judgment, the Plaintiff-Respondents had not brought any record 
of the City Commission's proceedings before the court. 
Consequently, it would be impossible for the-district court to 
determine that the City Commission had acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously. Therefore, defendants' motion for summary 
judgment on this point should have been granted. 
Although as explained, supra, this Court should not 
reweigh the information considered by the Commission in reaching 
its decision, the information supplied to the Commission and the 
evidence of the Commission's conduct demonstrates that it 
was well informed at the time of the vote on annexation. Its 
actions were neither arbitrary nor capricious. (See, ~. 
Mayor Wilson's Depo. pp. 18-22, 31, 33 & Ex. 9, at R. .) 
The facts show that the city conducted extensive 
public hearings on the Annexation Petitions, which included 
-51-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
discussions of proposed zoning ordinances, public service 
requirements, and improved health and safety for canyon 
residents. The City Commission members who voted on the 
Annexation Petitions were also provided with extensive and 
detailed studies by various city departments, including 
fire, police, sewage, water, and health which concerned the 
impact of annexation upon the city resources and the residents 
of the annexed area. Clearly, it cannot be said that a 
decision reached by a legislative body after this r.iuch 
research and consideration is arbitrary and capricious. 
3. In approving the petition for annexation, 
all of the requirements of Section 10-2-401, Utah Code Ann. 
(Pocket Supp. 1977) were followed and adhered to. 
a. On the morning of the City Commission's 
action, the City Attorney reviewed the latest maps and assessnen: 
rolls and petitions. He determined that not only as to the 
consolidated petition, but even as to each of the three petit~m 
separately, there were the requisite signatures petitioning f~ 
annexation. 
Based upon that review, I am of the opinion 
that a majority of property owners on 
each of the annexation petitions presently 
favors connection to the City on the following 
particulars: 
Petition Ill 
Petition #2 
Petition #3 
SS. 767. 
100.00/. 
100 .001. 
The total property owners petitioning represent, 
by my figures, 61.2S~~ of all property owners in 
the subject area. (Letter frora Wally Miller, 
Deputy City Attorney to Bd. of City Commissioners, 
April 10, 1979.) (at R. 171-172.) 
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on the date of the vote there were sufficient signatures under 
the statute to require the City Commission action. 
b. The signers of all petitions were fully 
informed of the area requested to be annexed by the particular 
petitions. Both Mr. Gardner and Hr. Johnson in their depositions 
testified that they had shown the proper maps to all of the 
residents living within the area outlining the areas to be 
annexed. (Gardner Depo., pp. 43-44, at R. 871-872; and Johnson 
Depa., p. 33, at R. 927.) 
c. The Salt Lake Planning and Zoning 
CoQmission found that the area to be annexed was contiguous to 
Salt Lake City. (Jorgensen Depo. pp. 8-11, at R. 824.) 
Specifically, the Commission found that petition No. 1 was 
contiguous to Salt Lake City and that petitions 2 and 3 are 
contiguous to petition 1. Consolidated, that contiguous area 
is contiguous to Salt Lake City. 
d. Plaintiff-Respondents claim that the 
action was not timely, suggesting that the City should have 
not done such a thorough job in investigating the proposals. 
Such a position is untenable. No evidence was presented of any 
unnecessary delay, but only of a desire of the Commission to 
review all the issues thoroughly. 
e. The record in the district court shows 
that no unincorporated island will be created as a result of the 
annexation. Section 10-2-402 prohibits only those annexations 
"which would result in unincorporated islands being left within 
the boundaries of the municipality." In order to come within 
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the ambit of this prohibition, Plaintiff-Respondents would have 
had to show that the proposed annexation would: (1) create 
an unincorporated island; and (2) that said island would lie 
within the boundaries of the munciipality. No such showing was 
made or even suggested to the district court. 
F. The Findings of Fact Sip,ned by the Judge after 
the Notice of Appeal had been Filed, Transferring Jurisdic-
tion to this Court, are not Supported by the Evidence. 
A number of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
law do not reflect the evidence before the court. Pertaining 
to Finding 3 and 4, there was no evidence presented which 
supported the finding that Plaintiff-Respondents Doenges, 
Crockard and Watson were residents and property owners of the 
area sought to be annexed at all relevant times. Furtherr.1ore, 
there was no evidence in the record to support the finding 
that Watson was an o\mer of real property in the area to be 
annexed "for more than one year". Specifically, \.latson at 
his deposition testified that he had only moved into the area 
in November of 1978, long after the assessnent rolls had been 
filed. (Watson Depo., p. 4, at R. 827.) 
As is more full explained infra, Conclusion No. 3, 
that Plaintiff-Respondents have standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of Section 10-2-401, is incorrect. There 
is no evidence to support any claim of standing that was before 
the court at any time prior to the entry of the Memorandum 
Decision on August 20, 1979. Further, Conclusion of Law No. 
5 is incorrect in that there was no evidence presented, no 
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argument made or claim stated in any pleading of any injury 
to the Plaintiff-Respondents, let alone an irreparable injury. 
(~. supra, pp. 18-20; also see Transcript of Proceedings of 
August 9, 1979, PP· 48-49, at R. 1103-1104, where Plaintiff-
Resondents' attorney alleged the only injury to Plaintiff-Respondents 
is the transfer of their property from the county into the 
city of Salt Lake. This, as explained above, is not irreparable 
injury. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff-Respondents are without standing to raise 
the issue of constitutionality of Section 10-2-401, Utah Code Ann. 
(Pocket Supp. 1977). There is no constitutional right to vote on an 
annexation proposal. Annexations are for the legislature to decide. 
Where the decision of annexation is made by a munciipal commission, 
a party having the right to be heard before that commission is not 
denied equal protection or due process. Therefore, the Memorandum 
Decision of the district court should be reversed. Further, the 
court below was without jurisdiction to enter Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. This Court should reverse the district court in 
its entirety and find that the annexation resolution of the Salt 
Lake City Board of Commissioners was proper and order annexation 
of Emigration Canyon. 
DATED this 9th day of November, 1979. 
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PART 4-EXTENBION OF CORPORATE LIMITS 
Sect ion 
10-2-401. Annexation ot contiguous territory. 
10-2-402. Limitations on annexation. 
10-2-403. Annexation deemed conclush·e. 
10-2-404. Annexation across county lines. 
10-2-401. Annexation of contiguous territory.-Whenever a majority 
of the owners of real property and the owners of at least one third in 
\'alue of the real property, as shown by the last assessment rolls, in terri-
tory lyi1:g contiguous to the ~orporate boundaries of any municipality, 
shall desire to annex such territory to such municipality, they shall cause 
an accurate plat or map of such territory to be made under the supen-ision 
of the municipal engineer or a competent surveyor, and a copy of such 
plat or map, certified by the engineer or surveyor as the case may be, shall 
be filed in the office of the recorder of the municipality, together \'l"ith a 
written petition signed by a majority of the real property owners and by 
the owners of not less than one third in value of the real property, as shown 
by the last assessment roles, of the territory described in the plat or map; 
and the go\'erning body of the municipality, at a regular meeting shall 
vote on the question of such annexation. The members of the governing 
body may by resolution passed by a two-thirds vote, accept the petition 
for annexation, subject to the terms and conditions as they deem reason-
able, and the territory shall then and there be annexed and within the 
boundaries of the municipality. If the territory is annexed, a copy of the 
duly certified plat or map shall at once be filed in the office of the county 
recorder, together with a certified copy of the resolution declaring the 
annexation. The articles of incorporation of the municipality shall be 
amended to sho\\" the new territory annexed to the municipality and a copy 
of the artirles of amendment shall be filed with the secretary of state and 
count~- clerk or clerks in the same manner as prescribed in 10-2-108. On 
filing the maps, plats and articles of amendment, the annexation shall be 
deemed complete and the territory annexed shall be deemed and held to 
be part of the annexing municipality, and the inhabitants thereof shall 
enjoy the pri\'ileges of the annexation and be subject to the ordinances, 
resolutions and regulations of the annexing municipality. 
Hlstory: c. 1953, 10·2·401, enacted by cil, nor was it unreasonable and arbitrary. 
L. 1977, ch. 48, § 2. Child v. City of Spanish Fork, 538 P. 2d 
Conditions to annexation. 
City was permitted to prodde for added 
or expanded services by imposition of rea-
sonable conditions precedent to the annex-
ntion of new territory, and its demand for 
transfer of water rights in return for 
annexation w:is not inconsistent with, nor 
in exerss of, the po"·ers of the city coun-
184. 
City had no duty to issue bonds, thus 
oblij?ating entire city to pay for the ac-
quisition of addit.ional. water needed ~s 
result of annexation, in order to a,·01d 
requiring transfer of annex area property 
owners' water rights to the city as a 
condition precedent to annexation. Child 
v. City of Spanish Fork, 538 P. 2d 184. 
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